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Abstract—This paper presents a scheme named code hopping
(CodeHop) for gaussian wiretap channels based on nonsystematic
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. Different from tradi-
tional communications, in the CodeHop scheme, the legitimate
receiver (Bob) rapidly switches the parity-check matrix upon
each correctly received source message block. Given an authen-
ticated public feedback channel, the transmitter’s (Alice) parity-
check matrix can also be synchronized with the receiver’s. As
a result, once an eavesdropper (Eve) erroneously decodes a
message block, she may not be able to follow the update of
subsequent parity-check matrices. Thus, the average BER of Eve
will be very close to 0.5 if the transmitted number of message
blocks is large enough. Focused on the measure of security gap
defined as the difference of channel quality between Bob and Eve,
numerical results show that the CodeHop scheme outperforms
other solutions by sufficiently reducing the security gap without
sacrificing the error-correcting performance of Bob.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, security of data transmissions has been han-
dled at upper protocol layers, which presents wiretappers (Eve)
by cryptographic algorithms with a secret key privately shared
between a transmitter (Alice) and legitimate receivers (Bob).
This notion of security relies on the assumption that Eve has
limited resources. Thus, perfect secrecy was introduced by
Shannon [1], which proved that if the secret key rate is lager or
equal to the transmission rate, information-theoretical security
can be achieved such that the encrypted message reveals no
information of the source message.
Owing to the stochastic nature of communication channels,
the work of Shannon was extended to the model of wiretap
channel by Wyner [2], where information-theoretically secure
communication is possible when Eve’s channel condition is
worse than Bob’s, and secrecy capacity is measured as the
highest transmission rate that can be achieved by Bob without
any information leaked to Eve. Hereafter, Wyner’s work was
refined by Csiszar and Korner in [3], and then generalized to
gaussian wiretap channel in [4]. Note that the equivocation rate
at Eve can also be a metric for security, which is defined as
the conditional entropy of the source message with given Eve’s
noisy observation. More recently, scenarios including fading
channels [5], MIMO channels [6] and multi-user channels [7]
have also been investigated in the literature.
Recently, coding techniques attract much research interests
to achieve better security performance. In [8], for binary
erasure channel (BEC) and binary symmetric channel (BSC),
low-density parity-check (LDPC)-based wiretap codes are
constructed. For gaussian wiretap channels, lattice codes are
also developed in [9]. Moreover, with the emerging polar
codes techniques, a nested code structure is established for
binary-input symmetric-output (BISO) channels in [10]. All
the designs above are for asymptotically large block lengths,
which may be difficult to implement in practical systems. To
this end, an LDPC code design for BPSK-constrained gaussian
wiretap channel was shown in [11]. A joint error correction
and encryption using LDPC codes is also studied in [12].
Recently, in order to construct practical codes, the bit error
rate (BER) of message bits is measured for physical layer
security [13]. Specifically, if Eve’s BER is ensured to be close
to 0.5 and the error bits are i.i.d. distributed, she would be
unable to recover any information from the decoded messages.
Then, security gap was introduced by Klinc [14], which is
defined as the difference of the channel quality between Bob
and Eve, requiring Eve’s BER to be sufficiently secure, while
keeping Bob’s BER low enough to reliably receive messages.
In [15], Baldi reduced the security gap by implementing
nonsystematic LDPC codes using scrambling matrices, where
security is enhanced by considering automatic repeat-request
(ARQ). Also, a feedback-aided secure transmission scheme
using stopping sets of LDPC codes can be found in [16].
In this paper, the gaussian wiretap channel enhanced with
an authenticated feedback channel is considered, where an
LDPC-based code hopping (CodeHop) scheme is proposed
to improve physical layer security by reducing the security
gap. Using a structured-random LDPC code generator, the
parity-check matrix of CodeHop will be rapidly updated upon
a correctly received message block by Bob, which is then
notified to Alice with one bit feedback. Once Eve encounters
a decoding error, she may not be able to decode any more
message block without knowing the parity-check matrix in the
following transmission and then her average BER will be close
to 0.5. Thus, the security gap can be significantly reduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
system model of the CodeHop scheme is introduced. Then, the
construction of the structured-random LDPC codes is shown
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Fig. 1. System model of the gaussian wiretap channel with limited feedback.
in Section III. In Section IV, the security gap performance is
analyzed. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. THE LDPC-BASED CODE HOPPING SCHEME
In this section, system model of the gaussian wiretap
channel with limited feedback will be introduced, along with
the design of the encoder and the decoder.
A. System Model
As depicted in Fig. 1, for i = 1, 2, . . ., the secret source
to be transmitted is divided into k-bit message blocks mi,
which are encoded into n-bit codewords xi by the encoder at
Alice and then transmitted over an AWGN channel to Bob.
In the meantime, codewords are also perceived by Eve over a
noisier and independent AWGN channel. For Bob and Eve,
the received codewords are denoted by yi and zi, which
are recovered by the decoders as mˆi and m¯i, respectively.
Additionally, in our model, legitimate receivers are always
given a public feedback channel, which can be used to inform
Alice whether the current codeword is correctly decoded with
just one bit feedback fi.
Let PBe and P
E
e define the receiving BERs of Bob and
Eve, respectively. To guarantee both information reliability and
security, it is desired to constrain PBe to be lower than a fixed
threshold PBe,max(≈ 0) and P
E
e to be greater than a threshold
PEe,min(≈ 0.5). If the receiving SNRs at Bob and Eve are
denoted by SNRB and SNRE , it must hold that{
SNRB ≥ SNRB,min = p
−1(PBe,max), (1)
SNRE ≤ SNRE,max = p
−1(PEe,min), (2)
where p(·) denotes the BER as a function of the SNR, and the
inverse p−1(·) gives the target SNR for a given BER threshold.
Then, the security gap is defined as
Sg = SNRB,min − SNRE,max, (3)
where the SNRs are expressed in decibels (dB).
If both (1) and (2) are satisfied, the secrecy rate Rs can be
defined as the efficient transmission rate
Rs ≈ R =
k
n
, (4)
where in fact Rs is slightly less than R due to some overhead
bits in mi for integrity check. Note that the security gap Sg
measures the minimum required difference between Bob and
Eve’s SNR in dB for secure communication, and our target is
to reduce the security gap as small as possible.
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Fig. 2. Block diagrams of the encoder and the decoder. Note that the z−1
block denotes a delay unit.
B. Encoder and Decoder Design
In order to minimize the security gap of gaussian wiretap
channel, the CodeHop scheme is implemented such that each
source message blockmi will be encoded by a rapidly hopping
parity-check matrix of LDPC codes Hi. That is, Hi is not
fixed for all codewords. On the contrary, Hi will be generated
in real time according to the past correctly received source
message blockmi−1 by a parity-check matrix generator. Block
diagrams of the encoder and the decoder are both illustrated
in Fig. 2.
In the encoder of Alice, starting from a public agreed parity-
check matrixH0 and feedback f0 = 0, the LDPC parity-check
matrix Hi is generated by
Hi =
{
H(hash(mi−1)), if fi−1 = 1;
Hi−1, if fi−1 = 0;
(5)
where hash(·) is a hash function, and H(·) is the mapping
of structured-random LDPC codes described in Section III.
Thus, the parity-check matrix Hi will be updated when the
past source message mi−1 is successfully recovered by Bob,
i.e. fi−1 = 1. Otherwise, Hi will be kept the same as Hi−1.
In the decoder of Bob, the public feedback fi is the result of
integrity check for mˆi. Although the correctness of mi can be
determined by the syndrome of the decoded codeword in most
cases, it is still possible that there exist some undetected errors
in mˆi when the decoded codeword converges to another valid
codeword of Hi. Thus, integrity check, e.g. cyclic redundancy
check (CRC), is still needed to avoid such undetected errors,
and some overhead bits are required inmi to store the integrity
check value. As for the parity-check matrix Hi, it will be
generated as in the encoder of Alice.
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Fig. 3. Protograph P optimized for the rate-1/2 nonsystematic LDPC code.
III. STRUCTURED-RANDOM LDPC CODES
In this section, we will show how to generate nonsystematic
LDPC codes in real time via structured-random protograph
expanding. As presented by Thorpe in [17], protograph can
be regarded as the minimal base Tanner graph to describe an
LDPC code. Using protograph, our target is to puncture all of
the k information bits and transmit only the n parity bits in
the original (n+ k)-bit codeword. In order to avoid stopping
sets which make the iterative decoding of nonsystematic codes
difficult to converge, the code doping method [18] is adopted.
As for a rate-1/2 nonsystematic LDPC code, the result of
an optimized protograph P = (V,C,E) is given in Fig. 3,
which is equivalent to a 4× 6 base parity-check matrix HB,0
as shown below,
HB,0 =


1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
3 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 2 0 0

 . (6)
In the figure, there are a variable node set V = {v1, v2, ..., v6},
a check node set C = {c1, c2, ..., c4} and an edge set
E = {e1, e2, ..., e16} in the protograph P . Among all variable
nodes, the information nodes denoted by v1 and v2 will be
punctured. Thus, according to the requirement of code doping,
the check node c4 is designated to be connected to only one
punctured variable node v2 to trigger the convergence of the
iterative decoding.
Starting with the protograph P , a larger tanner graph can
be obtained by copy-and-permute operation. Let each edge
e ∈ E stand for a unique edge type. If expanded with a
factor of T , the copy-and-permute operation firstly replicates
the protograph P for T times and forms a set of T edge
copies for each edge type, whose endpoints are then permuted
among the variable and check nodes in the set. Thus the T
copies of the protograph are all interconnected in the derived
graph, which defines the Tanner graph for the derived code.
Note that the operation of edge expanding is equivalent to
matrix expanding for each element in the base matrix HB,0.
Each element of value w will be expanded to a T ×T matrix
with w ones in each row or column, and thus the equivalent
parity-check matrix can be of size 4T × 6T .
Instead of using random permutations on the set of each
edge type, permutations defined by algebraic structures such
as cyclic shift are preferred for the ease of description and
efficient implementation. That is to say, the protograph can be
expanded by choosing appropriate T×T circulant permutation
matrices IT (t) for each edge type, and the derived parity-check
matrix will become a T -circulant matrix. Note that each row
in IT (t) can be obtained by one bit cyclic right shifting its
previous row, and thus IT (t) is defined by its first row uT (t),
where uT (t) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and the shift value t ∈
J0, T−1K 1 denotes the position of the unique one in the vector.
Therefore, given the protograph P , the derived LDPC code can
be described by shift values of all the circulant permutations.
Usually searching for only one good code is satisfactory
for channel coding. However, now it is far more challenging
to construct a large amount of highly efficient LDPC codes
for the CodeHop scheme. Thus, expanding with just one
single stage is not enough. A multi-stage expanding scheme
is developed, which we referred to as a structured-random
protograph expanding technique. Specifically, the protograph
P will be expanded via L > 1 stages such that the total
expanding factor T = T1T2 · · ·TL, where Tl is the expanding
factor of the lth stage for l ∈ J1, LK and the equivalent
expanded parity-check matrix is denoted by HB,l.
• Structured expanding: In the first L − 1 stages, the pro-
tograph is carefully expanded to avoid short loops, low-
weight codewords or parallel edges, which can restrict
the general structure of the code. After L− 1 stages, all
the non-zero elements in HB,L−1 will equal 1.
• Random expanding: In the Lth stage, all of the edges in
the tanner graph will be randomly expanded, or equiv-
alently, all the non-zero elements in HB,L−1 will be
expanded to circulant permutations according to the hash
value of the past correctly decoded message mi−1.
After expanding the protograph P in Fig. 3, each parity-
check matrix Hi is a TL-circulant matrix with a size of
n× (n+ k), which can be written as Hi = [A,B] such that
A =
[
Awαβ
]
2×4
=


A111 A
1
12
A121 A
1
22
A331 A
1
32
0 A142

 , (7)
B =
[
Bwαβ
]
4×4
=


0 0 B113 0
0 0 0 B124
B131 B
1
32 0 0
B141 B
2
42 0 0

 . (8)
Note that n = 4T , k = 2T , and the first k = 2T nodes are
punctured as information nodes among all the n + k = 6T
variable nodes. There are totally J = |E|T/TL non-zero
elements in HB,L−1, each of which will be then replaced by
a TL × TL circulant permutation matrix ITL(t). Meanwhile,
all the zero elements in HB,L−1 will be replaced by a
TL×TL zero matrix 0TL×TL . Now, we rewrite the hash value
hash(mi+1) as a binary vector
ri = hash(mi−1) = (ri,0, ri,1, . . . , ri,j , . . . , ri,J−1), (9)
where each number ri,j ∈ J0, TL−1K is represented by log2 TL
bits in the vector ri. Therefore, all the random shift values
in the Lth stage will be controlled by the vector ri, whose
length is required to be h = J log2 TL bits. If the bit length
of hash(mi−1) is smaller than h, ri can be filled up by using
hash(mi−1) repeatedly. As for the parameters selected in the
first L−1 stages, i.e. all the expanding factors and shift values,
they are constant and will be publicly sent to Bob in advance.
1Note that Ja, bK := {a, a + 1, . . . , b}, which denotes the set of integers
between a and b.
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A. An example
With the structured-random expanding technique, a hopping
sequence of parity-check matrices for (2048, 1024) nonsys-
tematic LDPC codes is generated. From the protograph P in
Fig. 3, each parity-check matrix Hi will be constructed by
a total expanding factor T = T1T2T3 = 4 × 4 × 32 = 512
via L = 3 stages. In the first two stages, the protograph P is
expanded twice by factors of T1 = T2 = 4, which is intended
to separate all the parallel edges and guarantees the girth is
larger than 4 in the derived Tanner graph. In the third stage,
totally there are |E|T/T3 = 256 edges to be randomly ex-
panded by a factor of T3 = 32, which is described by a vector
ri with length of h = J log2 TL = 1280 bits. If SHA-256 is
adopted as the hash(·), the 256-bit hash value hash(mi−1)
will be repeated by four times to represent ri. Thus, a large
set of parity-check matrices H = {H(r) : r ∈ J0, 2256 − 1K}
is available to be randomly generated in the hopping sequence
of CodeHop.
To evaluate the error correcting performance of CodeHop,
it is different from the evaluation of a fixed LDPC parity-
check matrix. The BER of one hopping sequence will be
evaluated as how the CodeHop scheme works, that is, by per-
forming numerical simulations with rapidly switching parity-
check matrices. For the average performance of CodeHop,
random initial H0 will be tested to generate different hopping
sequences, whose BERs and FERs are averaged as the final
result. As shown in Fig. 4, the average BER and FER of the
structured-random nonsystematic (2048, 1024) LDPC codes
are plotted. The number of iterations is restricted by 63. It
can be seen that the average BER of nonsystematic LDPC
codes is slightly degraded by no more than 0.2 dB in Eb/N0,
compared with the systematic codes specified in CCSDS.
IV. SECURITY GAP ANALYSIS
In this section, the analysis of security gap using CodeHop
for gaussian wiretap channel with limited feedback will be
presented. Owing to the public feedback fi, the parity-check
matrix Hi will be always perfectly synchronized between
Alice and Bob. However, Eve is restricted to passively receive
the feedback fi. As a result, an event which we referred to
as synchronization error may happen. That is, there exists an
index iTH ∈ N, such that ziTH is not correctly decoded by Eve,
but yiTH is successfully recovered by Bob. Thus, Eve will be
not able to follow the update of the parity-check matrix Hi
for i ≥ iTH, and the subsequent source message blocks mi
cannot be decoded by Eve without any knowledge of Hi.
Let SNRB and SNRE denote the receiving SNRs of Bob
and Eve, respectively. The BER of Bob is given by
PBe = Pe(SNRB), (10)
where Pe(SNR) is the BER of the CodeHop scheme with
perfect synchronization that can be obtained from Fig. 4.
As for Eve’s BER, firstly the event of synchronization
error needs to be investigated. Assume that the total number
of source message blocks is N . Given Pf (SNR) as the
frame error probability (FER) of the CodeHop scheme with
perfect synchronization, the index iTH of the first erroneously
synchronized message block follows a geometric distribution.
Thus, for 1 ≤ i0 ≤ N , the probability of the event iTH = i0
can be derived by
Pr(iTH = i0) =
[
1− (1− PBf )P
E
f
]i0−1
(1− PBf )P
E
f , (11)
where we define PBf = Pf (SNRB) and P
E
f = Pf (SNRE). If
synchronization error never happens, the probability is denoted
by
Pr(iTH ≥ N + 1) = [1 − (1− P
B
f )P
E
f ]
N . (12)
Then, for a fixed index iTH, Eve’s erroneously received source
message blocks can be divided into two categories. The first
category involves the blocks mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ iTH − 1, which
are erroneously decoded with knowing the parity-check matrix
Hi. Actually, the number of block errors in the first category
follows a binomial distribution and can be estimated by the
mean value
NER(iTH) =
(iTH − 1)P
B
f P
E
f
1− (1− PBf )P
E
f
, (13)
where the averaged number of bit errors in such an erroneous
message block is given by
kER =
Pe(SNRE) · k
Pf (SNRE)
. (14)
The second category includes all the unknown message blocks
for iTH ≤ i ≤ N , which is caused by synchronization error
and cannot be decoded without knowingHi. That is, all of the
message bits in mi are randomly decoded and half of them
will be error bits. Finally, the BER of Eve can be obtained by
PEe =
N∑
i=1
kER ·NER(i) + 0.5k · (N − i+ 1)
k ·N
· Pr(iTH = i)
+
kER ·NER(N + 1)
k ·N
· Pr(iTH ≥ N + 1). (15)
From (10) and (15), we can characterize the security gap of
the CodeHop scheme for gaussian wiretap channel. As shown
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the BER curves for different security
gaps Sg and different number of transmitted message block N
using (2048, 1024) nonsystematic LDPC codes are illustrated.
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Fig. 5. BER of the CodeHop scheme for gaussian wiretap channel using
(2048, 1024) nonsystematic LDPC codes for different security gaps when
N = 1000 message blocks are transmitted.
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Fig. 6. BER of the CodeHop scheme for gaussian wiretap channel using
(2048, 1024) nonsystematic LDPC codes for different security gaps when
N = 10000 message blocks are transmitted.
If the BER threshold of Eve is set to be PEe,min = 0.49, for
N = 1000, we can see in Fig. 5 that Sg = 0.5dB is achievable
for the BER threshold of Bob PBe,max < 10
−5. If PBe,max is
relaxed to be less than 10−3, Sg = 0dB can be also achieved.
It can be inferred that with the help of public feedback fi and
rapidly hopping of the parity-check matrix Hi, the security
gap can be significantly reduced. Moreover, if N = 10000,
i.e. more source message blocks are transmitted, the security
gap performance can be further improved. E.g., for PBe,max <
10−5, the security gap Sg can be reduced to 0.2dB. This is
owed to the fact that all message blocks mi after iTH cannot
be decoded by Eve. Thus, more source message blocks to
be transmitted makes Eve suffer from more random decoded
blocks. It is worth noting that to make the error distributed
uniformly in the decoded message bits of Eve, interleaving is
needed for all the N transmitted source message blocks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Design of practical coding techniques for gaussian wiretap
channel is investigated in this paper. Based on nonsystematic
LDPC codes, we propose the CodeHop scheme in which the
LDPC parity-check matrix will be rapidly switched depending
on the most recent successfully recovered message block at
Bob. Enhanced by an authenticated public feedback channel,
Alice can be notified of the decoding state of Bob and
synchronize to the updated parity-check matrix with Bob.
However, Eve is restricted to passively follow the update of the
parity-check matrix. Once the event of synchronization error
occurs, she would be unable to decode the rest of the message
blocks. In the CodeHop scheme, security gap is considered as a
metric for physical layer security. It is verified with numerical
simulations that the security gap can be highly reduced with
finite length LDPC codes. In the future, more scenarios such as
fading channels will also be studied by applying the CodeHop
scheme.
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